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Foreword 
IIASA celebrated its twentieth anniversary on May 12-13 with its 
fourth general conference, IIASA '92: An International Conference 
on the Challenges to Systems Analysis in the Nineties and Beyond. 
The  conference focused on the relations between environment and 
development and on studies that integrate the methods and find- 
ings of several disciplines. The role of systems analysis, a method 
especially suited to taking account of the linkages between phenom- 
ena and of the hierarchical organization of the natural and social 
world, was also assessed, taking account of the implications this has 
for IIASA's research approach and activities. 
This paper is one of six IIASA Collaborative Papers published 
as part of the report on the conference, an earlier instalment of 
which was Science and Sustainability, published in 1992. 
If there is anyone who writes with authority on pensions and the 
problems that all industrial countries will confront in at  most the 
next 20 years it is Professor van Praag. He has been far ahead of his 
t ime in pointing out the fatal defect hidden in the present arrange- 
ment of social security. It was introduced and is now maintained 
and defended less from the viewpoint of long-term workability than 
for its short term convenience. 
The  system I refer to  is called Pay As You Go (PAYG), wherein 
no reserve is maintained; each year's tax collections (necessarily 
from those working) are paid out that same year to  those retired. 
The convenience of PAYG was that as soon as announced it could 
start  to pay retirees almost irrespective of the amounts they had 
contributed. It  necessarily reduces saving in the economy, turns 
one generation against the preceding generation, and has other in- 
cidental ill-effects, but these are not what concern van Praag and 
Dalen most. 
What  they fear is its instability in the face of demographic fluc- 
tuations, specifically the day when the postwar baby boom starts to 
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retire. Subsequent to the baby boom of the 1950s birth rates went 
down and stayed down, so that the cohorts to pay the pensions 
will be relatively small, just as the cohorts coming to collect them 
will attain record size. Beyond that fact, caused by the changing 
birth rate, is the decline in mortality, the increased fraction of each 
cohort living to extreme old age. What happens when these facts 
require that payroll taxes go up to the 25 percent of all wages that 
will ultimately be necessary if the retired are to have social security 
inconies equal to 80 percent of the average wage? 
PAYG depends on each generation as it makes its payments 
trusting that the next generation will continue do the same; once 
doubt starts to spread the fragility of the whole system is revealed. 
We are told that the system is supported by a "contract between the 
generations" but the "contract" is metaphorical, as will be revealed 
in a few years when the crunch comes. 
Effects go beyond the social security system; they create a 
wholly artificial and unnecessary conflict between the generations. 
With PAYG a shortsighted younger generation can become alarmed 
at what is ultimately good news for all - the rapidly growing num- 
ber of octogenarians and people even older - and be tempted to 
vote against further use of their taxes for research into and therapy 
of the chronic diseases of old age. 
But you do not require my explanation of the problem of PAYG. 
You not only have it better expressed by van Praag and Dalen, but 
they provide a remedy, one that will be the more painless the sooner 
it is initiated. 
Committee for IIASA '92 
Nathan Keyfitz (Chair)* 
*Members of the  Committee for IIASA '92 were: Nathan Keyfitz (Chair) ,  Peter E. 
de  Jbnosi. Alexander Kurzhanski, Arkadii Maltsev, NebojSa Nakidenovid, Roderick 
Shaw,  Claudia I-Ieilig-Staindl, Evelyn Farkas 
Aging Populations and 
Social Challenges 
Bernard M.S. van Praag 
Hendrik P. van Dalen 
Abstract 
The aging of populations can have some severe implications 
for the present social security systems. In this paper we dis- 
cuss the challenges aging poses to  social security design. The 
pro and contra arguments for social security are examined, fol- 
lowed by the challenges social security has to  face in decades 
to  come, viz. combining equity with efficiency, and the interna- 
tional integration of economies and regions. Immigration as a 
policy instrument to  counter aging is rejected as a viable op- 
tion. The implied increase in savings, brought about by a shift 
toward capital-reserve systems, and investing those resources in 
the capital-scarce regions could be the most important challenge 
for the world economy. 
1 Introduction 
At  every moment  in t ime  some people will t ry t o  bring t h e  message 
across t h a t  we a re  living at a remarkable juncture in t ime.  So if 
we say a t  this  moment  tha t  we a re  living a t  such a juncture, this  
Research was carried out with the support of the Netherlands Organization for Sci- 
entific Research (NWO),  grants #18.059 and #450-226-026. 
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands and Tinbergen Institute, Depart- 
ment of Mathematical Economics, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
2 B.M.S. van Praag and N.P. van Dalen 
Table 1. Some demographic figures. 
CBR.* C D R *  Life 
(births (deaths Dependency expectancy 
per 1000) per 1000) TFR* rate at birth 
Japan 
1965-70 17.8 7 2 .O 9.7" 71.1 
1985-90 11.4 7 1.7 16 .8~ 77.2 
Germany ('BRD) 
1965-70 16.7 12 2.3 20.7" 70.3 
1985-90 10.4 12 1.4 22.1b 74.5 
Netherlands 
1965-70 19.2 8 2.7 16.0" 73.6 
1985-90 11.8 9 1.5 18.6' 76.5 
*CBR = crude birth rate, CDR = crude death rate, T F R  = total fertility ra.t,e. 
a 1970. 
* 1990. 
is in fact a traditional message. This message is not inspired by 
the abrupt transition of Eastern Europe from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy, but by a much less con- 
spicuous phenomenon. In nearly all Western welfare states we are 
confronted with a rather unique development: the fall of the birth 
rate below replacement rate and consequently a future fall in the 
total population and an increase in life expectancy leading to an 
aging of populations; an aging which has already begun inaking its 
imprint in indust,rialized countries. In earlier times we witnessed 
similar trends, but  this was due to famines, wars, mass migration 
and the like; in our time it is a trend not triggered from such out- 
side forces. Additionally, in contrast to earlier situations the trend 
seems to be rather permanent. Table 1 presents some demographic 
trends. 
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Standard economic theory has always taken a positive and con- 
stant population growth rate for granted. We do not dare to say 
that if we had a theory covering negative growth rates, it would 
have been of much use to counter the very real problen~s caused by 
the present development of population in the first world. However, 
it shows how unexpectedly this downturn has come. 
Why is it that aging populations present such a problem for 
modern economies? There are two main reasons. First, there is 
the productivity problem. [See for a discussion and analysis of this 
problem, Murphy and Welch (1990) and Theeuwes et  al. (1985).] 
Productivity seems to be more age-related than in earlier periods 
when early education and skills required during apprenticeship were 
sufficient for a lifetime. Due to swift technical progress, intensive 
monitoring of individual productivity, together with the socially 
excluded possibility of lowering wages in accordance with falling 
productivity, nowadays in many sectors of industry there is only 
one way out for the older worker: early retirement or dismissal, 
as downwards and internal mobility within the firm is mainly ex- 
cluded. 
The second reason why aging is such a problem nowadays, is 
that there is such an extensive social security system which pre- 
scribes that the w o r k e r s  in society have to take care of the aged.  
Due to a decline in population growth the potential work force will 
decrease, whereas the number of old-aged will increase due to an 
increase in life expectancy. In short, the d e p e n d e n c y  ra t io  rises. 
Table 2 shows how dependency ratios in the next 60 years will de- 
velop if the aging process remains unaltered. Under such conditions 
the welfare state may come into jeopardy. 
In this paper we shall at first consider the specific relations 
between the welfare state and demography. It will be argued that 
social security is very sensitive to changing demographic structures. 
In Section 3 we explain that social security itself is not the main 
villain, but that most of the risks result from the specific way of 
financing social security, viz. by a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. 
It is argued that most parts of the system could just as well be 
run on the basis of a compulsory capital reserve (CR) system and 
that a thoughtful and flexible mix of a PAYG and a CR system 
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Table 2. Old age dependency ratios in a selected number of OECD 
countries (population 65 and over / population 15-64), in percent. 
USA 17.1 18.7 18.3 
Japan 13.4 16.6 22.4 
Germany 23.4 22.5 25.1 
France 21.9 21.0 23.1 
United Kingdom 23.3 23.1 22.3 
Italy 20.8 20.3 22.9 
Canada 14.1 16.8 19.0 
Major 7 19.1 19.9 21.9 24.2 35.2 36.3 
Small countries 18.9 19.7 20.9 23.2 34.0 35.1 
Total OECDa 19.0 19.8 21.2 23.5 34.4 35.4 
" Unweighted average. 
Source: OECD (1988). 
would make society less prone to  both demographic and other risks; 
risks that  cannot be insured by market systems. In Section 4 we 
consider the transition problem, that is, how can we shift from a 
PAYG to a CR system with minimum waste of society's resources? 
Our conclusion will be that such a shift, contrary to folklore, is not 
very painful and in fact perfectly feasible within a limited number 
of years. Actually, we do not advocate a 100% shift and this makes 
things even more feasible. In Section 5 we consider the widely cited 
suggestion of promoting more immigration to the aging countries 
as a substitute for the lacking indigenous population growth. In 
our view this is a non-solution. Finally we give a thought to  the 
idea of investing capital, generated by new CR funding, in LDCs 
where there is shortage. We then summarize our standpoint. 
2 Demography and the Welfare State 
In this section we shall try to analyze the notion of the modern 
welfare state and the way in which it is related to demographics. 
After the Second World War the welfare state expanded rapidly. 
The  Beveridge report (1942) propounded the state's responsibility 
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for individual welfare "from the cradle to the grave" and from that 
moment on the term welfare state is linked to the idea of such a 
mixed economy. Although the welfare state is a phenomenon we 
all know, there is a great variety of forms. The USA, Japan, Ger- 
many, the Netherlands or Sweden all have their own types of welfare 
states. That makes it rather hard to define one national character- 
ization of the welfare state. A second point which has to be kept in 
mind is that all Western welfare states have not been constructed 
after a carefully planned "grand design", but that they have been 
developed piecemeal during a long period of legislation stretching 
over at least 50 years. So in most countries the structure of the 
welfare state may be seen as a building which has been extended 
and renovated over various periods; most parts, added during vari- 
ous periods, are still distinguishable and the link between the parts 
is frequently less than perfect. 
Against this background let us look for some common basic 
features of Western welfare states. The core point seems to be 
the existence in society of a social security system which may be 
described by the following characteristics: 
( a )  A collective compulsory insurance for specific groups of the pop- 
ulation against "risks" such as health costs, sickness, labor dis- 
ability, uncertain lifetime, unemployment and retirement. 
( b )  At an individual level insurance premiums are not automatically 
equivalent to the insured risk. 
(c)  The insurance schemes are determined by legislation by some 
governing body (state, municipal, provincial, Federal legisla- 
tion), that is to say, they are influenced by the prevailing polit- 
ical pressure groups. 
( d )  Enrollment in such a scheme is compulsory for (by law) well- 
defined groups and at the same time impossible for other groups 
who do not qualify for the enrollment criteria. 
It is evident that most, but not all of these "risks" can be in- 
sured in the free market by commercial insurance companies. How- 
ever, it is likely that under these circumstances premiums will be 
risk-differentiated according to  market criteria and it follows that 
premiums will differ between persons or groups of persons. If this 
were not so, insured persons with a low risk who were asked by 
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company A t o  pay a higller than market premium would lea,ve the 
iiisllra,nce scheme and go to another coillpany B, whichoffers in- 
surance for less. In such a wa.y conlpa.ny A would be forced to  
a.sk a, higher prenliun~ for the rema,ining high risks and a.gain some 
crowding out to company B would take place. It follows t,ha.t in 
a free market ~oithout a con-ipulsory schedule it will be impossil~le 
to  insure risks a t  other premiums (prices) than market-equilibriuln 
prices. 
It is only due to  the conzpu,lsory character tha.t social security 
scliedules for market-insurable risks are possible. In fact, as rnost, 
people do not insure themselves twice, this will eliminate t,he via.- 
l~il i ty of private insura.nce against such risks. However, a. nottable 
exception is found in the British health insurmce systenl where 
a, subshnt ia l  part of the population has itself priva.tely insured in 
addition t o  the mandatory national health service. 
In the case of a market-insurable risk it may be safely sa,id that 
the sit,uation generated by social security schedules is not Pareto- 
optimal or Pareto-efficient. Let the present allocation be denoted 
by CI ,  then there is a situation B which is Pareto-efficient compa.red 
to  C. ( A  market-allocation C is called Pareto-ine.ficient if another 
allocation B were possible, whicli makes sonle people better off and 
no one worse off.) That  it is not Pareto-optimal is easily seen since 
t,he allocation cannot be generated in a free market economy; i t  is 
not sustaillable by the market. 
In the theory of welfare economics much weight is given to  the 
criterion of Pareto-optimality. It is a well understood criterion. Tlic 
primary reaction to Pareto-inefficiency is to  iniprove upon that sit,u- 
ation (by moving toward the contract curve in the Edgeworth box). 
However, that is too easily argued. In fact, it is possible t o  elim- 
inate the social security schedule and to  give the market i t s  wa,y. 
In this case the Pareto-optimal outcome A of the allocation pro- 
cess will depend on the initial allocation of physical wealth, human 
wealth and power over individuals. It may a.nd probably will be the 
case that  the resulting Pareto-optimal situation A does not equal 
the desirable situation B. It is even likely that  A is considered by 
society to  be worse than B. This brings to  light that there are two 
optimality concepts by which to judge a social allocation, viz. 
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( a )  Pareto-optimality ( "optimality in the small" ). 
( b )  Social optimality ( "optimali ty in the large"). 
The second concept is based on the notion that a social alloca- 
tion may be judged by means of a social welfare function (SWF). 
One social allocation is better than another if it entails higher social 
welfare, i.e., if it scores higher in terms of our social welfare func- 
tion. If we allow the social welfare evaluation of an allocation A 
be SWF (A),  then we may have SWF(A) < SWF(C) < SWF(B).  
As B is not reachable via the market given our initial allocation 
of wealth and A is estimated worse than C, it can be completely 
rational to accept the Pareto-non-efficient social allocation C.  Ac- 
P 
tually, Pareto-optimality (denoted by 4 )  is a partial ordering of 
allocations only. Clearly, if C ~ B  then, too, SWF(C) < SWF(B) 
for any reasonable notion of social welfare. However, situations A 
and C cannot be ordered according to the Pareto criterion as in the 
case of switching from C to A, some people will improve themselves, 
while others will be worse off. Hence we do not know whether C$A 
or A ~ C .  The Pareto-criterion can lead a person to tolerate states 
in which wide-spread poverty exists amidst small-scale plenty and 
this same person may still be tempted to call this state "optimal". 
Therefore, if we have the idea that C is better than A, this judgment 
is based on a social welfare ordering, by means of which all alloca- 
tions may be compared with each other. We assume that it may 
be described by a social welfare function. Now, the acceptance of 
such a social welfare function implies an interpersonal comparison 
of individual welfare. Mainstream economics (since Robbins, 1935, 
and Samuelson, 1947) rejects the possibility of interpersonal utility 
comparison and hence the notion of an SWF. Nevertheless, in some 
branches of economic theory other than welfare economics (e.g., 
optimal growth theory) the idea of a.n SWF is accepted as a viable 
instrument. It may be said that economists are rather schizophrenic 
about the issue. Only recently [see van Praag (1991) and other con- 
tributions in a special issue of the Journal of Econometrics (edited 
by Maasoumi, 1991) about the possibility of welfare measurement], 
has it been reluctantly recognized by some economists that welfare 
economics without the use of the wider Bergsonian social welfare 
ordering concept (Bergson, 1938) will not bring us very far. 
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The upshot of this discussion is that, given that one accepts 
an SWF-ordering, a non-Pareto-optimal allocation with social se- 
curity inay be preferred to a Pareto optimum without. In addition 
to this ethical argument, one can empirically support the view that 
public choices in heterogeneous societies are inspired by income- 
distributional concerns. Tabellini (1990) found that the cross- 
country differences in social security outlays are well explained by 
the inequality of the pre-tax income and by the age-composition 
of the population. The theory behind this finding is that in eyui- 
librium, the size of social security is larger the greater the pre-tax 
income inequality and the larger the fraction of old aged persons 
in the population. In a similar cross-country study Persson and 
Tal~ellini (1992) found that there exists a positive relationship be- 
tweeil the pre-tax income distribution and the rate of economic 
growth. In short, the more equal the pre-tax income distribution 
the higher the rate of economic growth. 
So far, we have been discussing market-insurable risks. There 
are, however, risks which are not market-insurable. The first ex- 
ample is the risk of unemployment. A commercial unemployment 
insurance is impossible since people can choose to become unern- 
ployed. Besides this argument one should take account of the fact 
that unemployrnent risks of many insured are strongly positively 
correlated, due to the business cycle and the fact that inany work- 
ers are employed in the same firm or industry. For non-market 
insurable risks there are only two options, viz., to abstain from any 
insurance or to create a social security scheme on a compulsory 
basis. In this situation, too, the SWF-ordering may point to set- 
ting u p  a social security scheme. This analysis does not imply that 
presently established social security syst,ems are always defensible 
from a social welfare point of view. In this respect there are three 
points which are a matter of concern. 
2.1 Changing social preferences 
In the first place citizens do not have the sarne SWF. As govern- 
rnents and parliaments in particular express and reflect the prefer- 
ences of citizens they are intended to represent, the SWF, which the 
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legislating body utilizes, Iilay differ over time according to the polit- 
ical composition. Clearly the ideas about and realizations of social 
security advocated by political partips co-d~termine tlie llumber of 
votes they will be given, and hence a socio-political ecluilibrium 
with a rather stable social security scheme coupled with a stable 
political composition of government is probable. However, it is cer- 
tainly not always true. Hence, the answer to  the questioil of which 
social security system is considered optimal may change wit11 shift- 
ing political preferences or a changing rate of time preference (van 
Dalen, 1991 ). 
2.2 Changing demographics 
Most of the risks insured by social security systems depend 011 the 
demogl-aphics of a country. First, what do we mean by demograph- 
ics? Actually, this is a somewhat complex notion, but we think 
primarily of the age-distribution, the frequency of divorce and wid- 
owhoocl, the birthrate and the lnortality rate. Purely demographic 
risks are child allowances and retirement pensions. Apart from 
those factors, there are many risks which are partly determined by 
demographics. These risks are age-related. We think of: 
labor disability; 
illness; 
health costs; 
unemployment; 
early retirement; 
social assistance for families and persons in need; 
widow(er) pensions. 
In all of those risks it is clear that higher age brackets run 
a higher risk than younger age brackets. For an example of 
how health care claims and age-related disability incidence in the 
Netherlands really are, see Tables 3 and 4 .  From Table .3 one can 
deduce that  the distribution of health cost claims is strongly age- 
related. The  frequency of claims in individuals older than 65 years 
is approximately 4 times as high as the frequency of individuals 
younger than 25. If one realizes that the value of the claims also 
increases steeply with age, then it must be clear that health cost 
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Table 3. Relative number of claimants claiming health care ac- 
cording to age, based on a sample of 35,246 persons, The Nether- 
lands, 1976. 
From specialists Physio- 
therapy Transpor- 
Age in Hospital In-patient Out-patient & mobility tation 
years 
16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
2 80 
care care 
0.0362 0.0369 
0.0425 0.0432 
0.0638 0.0567 
0.0781 0.0776 
0.0703 0.0697 
0.0766 0.0766 
0.0796 0.0768 
0.0915 0.0905 
0.0868 0.0861 
0.1048 0.0996 
0.1250 0.1190 
0.1356 0.1310 
0.1553 0.1513 
0.1412 0.1274 
care aids 
0.0246 
0.0153 
0.0268 
0.0353 
0.0501 
0.0578 
0.0664 
0.0709 
0.0792 
0.0809 
0.0723 
0.0818 
0.0712 
0.0832 
services Total 
0.0134 0.3026 
0.0111 0.2827 
0.0193 0.3546 
0.0149 0.3879 
0.0124 0.4092 
0.0170 0.4191 
0.0202 0.4610 
0.0270 0.4770 
0.0301 0.4711 
0.0343 0.4928 
0.0527 0.5045 
0.0725 0.5273 
0.0890 0.5480 
0.1135 0.5296 
Total 0.0836 0.0814 0.3986 0.0558 0.0280 0.4284 
Source: van der Laan (1988, pp. 65-67). 
Table 4. Disability incidence rates by age and sex in the Nether- 
lands, 1989, in percent. 
Age bracket Males Fen1 ales 
15-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
Total 
Source: Aarts and De Jong (1992). 
insurance is closely related to the demographic state of a country. 
As one can see from Table 4 the same type of reasoning applies to 
the Dutch disability insurance scheme. 
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It follows that if demographics change, a social security scheme 
which was preferred until now, gradually may become undesirable. 
It is not only the risks that are demographically determined. If a 
risk increase implies a shift in secondary income from some groups 
to others in the form of public pension benefits, it implies as well 
that the source groups have to pay more. For instance, to take a 
simple example, if people under 65 pay social contributions, from 
which the over-65 get their old age benefits under a pay-as-you- 
go system, an increase in the elderly population implies a larger 
burden in the aggregate. If the young population increases propor- 
tionally, the contribution per capita does not change. However, as 
is frequently the case, the young population does not grow propor- 
tionally with the old to be supported, and the young have to pay a 
growing contribution per capita. 
From this example it is clear that a specific social security 
scheme may yield widely varying social allocations depending on 
the demographic situation. Should the SWF of government remain 
the same, this would already pose a problem. However, it may be 
conjectured that an older population will have another preference 
with regard to  social allocations than a younger one. It follows 
that not only social security schemes yield different allocations un- 
der different demographics, as argued before, but that they are also 
judged by different social welfare functions, e.g., a "young" and an 
"old" S WF,  respectively. 
As time goes by and demographic parameters such as the mor- 
tality rate and birth rate change, the age distribution changes as 
well. Until recently, neither politicians nor citizens have been aware 
of this phenomenon, except at a very abstract level. Social security 
schemes have been legislated during the last century nearly invari- 
ably under the tacit assumption that the age distribution would 
stay nearly the same in the decades to come. But this assumption 
has not come true. Roughly speaking, populations have become 
older, and this implies that as the chance of eligibility rises with 
age, the benefit burden for existing schedules and given benefit 
rates is increasing and the young population of contribution payers 
is shrinking. The dependency ratio is rising for nearly all programs. 
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2.3 Social tensions and Ponzi-games 
It will be obvious to most of us that the sketched situation prevails 
in many Western welfare states and that it leads to growing social 
tensions. It is true that nearly all social security schemes are fixed 
by law. This is not only done because such schemes are infeasible 
if not based on a con~pulsory basis. It is also fixed for a long term, 
usually indefinitely, in order that people can plan their lives around 
it. 
For instance, a state pension or a state health insurance would 
not inspire any confidence in people, i f  one would not be reasonably 
sure that approxinlately the same system will be there throlighout 
one's remaining lifetime. Hence, such systems are based on an enor- 
mous amount of confidence, guaranteed by law. However, it is not 
the normal confidence between contract partners wl~ere both part- 
ners are giving and taking on a quid pro quo basis; it is also riot 
the situation of mutual support where parties give and take alter- 
natingly. In social security we have a separation in time, where the 
young give and the old take. There is a one-way dependency. Let 
us now assume that at a specific point in time the dependency rate 
is rising so high that the young generation refuses to pay altogether 
or at least wants to reduce the benefits. What can the beneficiaries 
do? They may cite the law, but i f  the young have the political ma- 
jority they call change the law. If the beneficiaries do not have the 
political majority, the threat of a turnover of the existing political 
system is real. It is this predicament which might soon become 
a real problem in some countries and even more so as the social 
security contract in the form of a pay-as-you-go system is basically 
a Ponzi-game based on the assumption that the succeeding gener- 
ation will not step out of the schedule. [For the conditions of a 
rational Ponzi-game, see O'Connell and Zeldes (1988).] If a young 
generation knew, or at least presumed, that when they are old they 
will not be supported by their offspring as they themselves are sup- 
posed to support their parents, the current young generation would 
have to pay twice, first for the benefits of their parents, the now 
old generation, and secondly they would have to save out of their 
present income for their own old age. This is not easily done. Most 
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likely, support for the old would be reduced severely to rnake roo111 
for the necessary savings. 
The upshot of this section may be summarized as follows: 
( a )  All social security systems have the same traits. They are in- 
surance systems where the younger/strongel part of the pop- 
ulation promises to pay tlie risks for the olderlweaker part of 
the population. 
( b )  The social security premium is not a market price. 
( c )  The system is compulsory and established by law. As the sys- 
tem is cor-ripulsory there is virtually no room left for individual 
insurance against those risks. 
Although t,he social security system cannot be sustained by the 
market and hence is not Pareto-optimal, we do not see this as a 
major flaw, since the system may be socially better than other 
systems, which are Paxeto-optimal. Problems arise because most 
of the arrangements considered are, to a large extent, dependent 
on the demographic structure. First, social preferences concerning 
issues of equity and efficiency are determined by the dependency 
ratio; second, the whole volume of social insurance depends on 
the dependency ratio. This implies that changes in demographic 
structures will change what is considered to be the optimal system. 
This may lead to social tensions and a breakdown of the actual 
social security system. In the next section we will look at solutions. 
3 The Confidence Problem in Social Security 
Social security is a very old phenomenon. In Biblical times so- 
cial security was ordained by the Lord. First, we have the Ten 
Commandments which prescribe: "Honour your father and your 
mother. . . ." There is also the famous law that one-tenth of per- 
sonal income should be given to the poor. that the cornfield should 
not be cut, twice, etc., etc. In fact, these laws describe social con- 
tracts. It was not set up by democratic negotiations, but by the 
priests, maybe through divine inspiration. Its purpose, its outcome, 
and its workability were to a certain extent the same as what the 
present social security system is aiming at. These systems, at least 
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in spirit, have been taken over by Christianity and Islam. In non- 
Western religions we find similar elements. The raison d7etre for 
such social security systems is that otherwise a society with all of 
its enormous economies (generated by cooperation and a division 
of labor) is not viable. 
Did these old systems suffer from the same problems we 
sketched for modern systems? There is no doubt that they did. 
However, the demographic risk was countered by giving high value 
to married life and high fertility. In this way, as well as a lack of 
reliable contraception techniques, a low dependency ratio was re- 
alized. Population growth was held in check by wars, famines and 
other disasters. Moreover, there was the wrath of God toward those 
who sinned too heavily against the solidarity rules. 
After the Industrial Revolution this system did not seem to 
work any more. First, in the urban societies with their large prole- 
tariat, the generalized dependency ratio of weak versus strong was 
just too large to be insured. Although even in the beginning of the 
19th century there was some social support system in England, it 
was completely insufficient. Second, the religious discipline and the 
sanction of God was no longer credible for most (well-to-do) peo- 
ple. The collapse of the old social security system, guaranteed by 
God, was gradually replaced by a worldly inspired system. Under 
the pressure of early socialist movements through Marx' preach- 
ings, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initiated, in 1871, 
the prototype of the modern social security system on the basis 
of a pay-as-you-go system. It was followed by programs in other 
countries. There is no doubt that the existence of a social security 
system enhanced the quality of life, reduced social tensions, fur- 
thered the social fabric and was a major precondition for Western 
economic growth. 
The system really is based on confidence and ethicalllegal pre- 
scriptions; the working and evaluation of the system depends on 
the (generalized) dependency ratio. As demographic conditions in 
most countries are on the move toward historically high depen- 
dency ratios, it follows that we have to expect a breakdown or at 
least a substantial trimming of the present system. This holds for 
110th varieties of public finance, i.e., for the pay-as-you-go system 
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with a noll~inally separate financial flow and for the payl.011-tax 
system where contributions and benefits are channelled via general 
tax revenues. In this paper we do not differentiate between either 
variation. 
If others cannot care for you when you are in need, you should 
look for ways in which you can do it yourself. The  other way is the 
cayltal reserve systern (CR) .  Individuals save during their worliing 
lives, or rather when they are young, and they cash in their savings 
when they are old. It is this system which is of course used to  
a large extent in private pension insurance. However, in the pure 
market solutioll there is no room for complete equalization and  
leveling between heterogeneous risk groups. In order t,o get some 
decent income redistribution between bad and good risks we may 
think of a compulsory capital-formation system. The  practice of 
the Dutch civil service, which is running the second-biggest pension 
fund in the world (ABP) for all Dutch civil servants on the basis of 
a (compulsory) capital reserve system is an example. 
Indeed, the idea that people are eating up their own savings is a 
not colnpletely valid metaphor. The capital, which has been saved 
via collective insurance, is invested in physical capital goods, firms 
and human capital. The  capital itself cannot so easily been drawn 
back. The  money which has been invested has to be paid back by 
the young generation, which works with this capital. Hence, there 
is some similarity with the social security system described before. 
If the young generation refuses to pay back the value of the capital 
invested, actually a case of exproprzation of the old, the old genera- 
tion does not get its support either. However, we estimate this risk 
as a far lower one than without the collateral of capital investment. 
In a modern open economy like the Netherlands the fund, governed 
by young and old, may and should diversify its investments accord- 
ing to  risks. In this respect the risk of refusal should be minimized 
by investing on the international capital market, so that the risk of 
refusal to  pay back becomes negligible, or at  least smaller. 
Let us now look a t  the comparative advantages and disadvan- 
tages of the CR and the PAYG system respectively. 
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3.1 T h e  demographic risk 
The first risk we run is the demographic risk, nowadays made visi- 
ble by the phenomenon of aging populations. It is obviously a big 
threat to the sustainability of the PAYG system. For the CR sys- 
tem, the basic risk of a demographic shift is a.bsent, for each cohort 
pays for itself. Demographic shifts are not completely without con- 
sequences for the capital-formation system either, as the young may 
fail to  pay their interest dues to the old. It  is also conceivable that 
in an aging population capital productivity may fall and heilce the 
interest rate, out of which the repayments have to  be made, inay fall 
as well. However, if investments are internationally distributed the 
demographic risks may be spread over a large number of countries, 
and that  risk will be minimal for the CR system. 
3.2 T h e  inflation risk 
One of the points in favor of the PAYG system is undoubtedly 
that  it is inflation-proof. Current dollars are cashed in and cashed 
out immediately. Only in a time of hyper-inflation might the PAYG 
system yield strongly deva,lued benefits. The capital reserve system 
is not inflation-proof, at  least when investment is placed in one or 
a few currency areas. Inflation reduces the value of the defined 
benefit entitlements because pension benefits are fixed in nominal 
terms. Most pension insurance arrangements do not provide anti- 
inflation provisions. A number of reasons are put forward by Bodie 
(1990) for this arrangement: 
( a )  These funds can in no way be used to avoid the inflation risk 
by an appropriate investment strategy. 
( b )  People already have enough inflation insurance, viz., through 
the indexed social security benefits and investments in residen- 
tial real estate. 
( c )  People suffer from "money-illusion", they mistakenly treat nom- 
inal values as if they were real. The lack of inflation hedge is a 
rather weak argument for the absence of inflation insurance. If 
investlnent,~ are widely spread over a variety of currency a r e a ,  
preferably in shares, indexed bonds and real investments, the 
long-term inflation-risk can be minimized. 
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3.3 The interest rate risk 
The capital reserve system depends heavily on the interest rate. 
The interest rate fluctuates and, given the open capital markets, 
it is virtually impossible to escape the risk of interest fluctuations. 
The real value of the principal, in general, will fluctuate with the 
interest rate; there is not much consolation to be had. The PAYG 
system is immune to interest rate fluctuations, although this im- 
munity is not entirely watertight, since wage-income developments 
are tied to capital-market developments. If capital is invested in 
various countries, as it should be, we cannot ignore the exchange 
rate fluctuations. With a wisely distributed spread of investments 
the risk may be minimal. 
3.4 Savings potential 
A point in favor of the CR system is that it generates savings. 
Given the growing scarcity of capital in the world these savings are 
badly needed. They increase labor productivity, too, and hence 
the wages of the workers. This is doubly advantageous. During 
the working period workers get better wages, and when they are 
pensioned their successors have higher productivity and better pay, 
and hence it is easier for the second generation to pay off the debts 
to their parents. 
Savings actually stem from two sources: entrepreneurial savings 
and private savings. The latter is tantamount to postponed con- 
sumption. It stands to reason that the more assured people are that 
consumption in old age will be provided by others, the less they will 
be motivated to save for themselves, and this lack of demotivation 
will be strengthened when the same workers simultaneously have to 
pay their contribution rates to the PAYG system. So for two rea- 
sons PAYG does not motivate private saving, while the CR system 
on a compulsory basis generates a fair amount of investments. Esti- 
mates of the negative influence of social security on private savings 
are ambiguous, however. Feldstein (1974) argued that the US social 
security system crowded out 40% of private savings in the period 
1929-1971. The picture becomes blurred, however, if we restrict 
our attention to the period 1947-1971. Feldstein (1977) found some 
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confirmation of the negative influence by a cross-section study of a 
number of industrialized countries. Other studies show that the ef- 
fect of social security is not as clear as Feldstein's estimates imply. 
Ba,rro and MacDonald (1977) show that for a cross-section of 16 
countries the Feldstein (1977) results cannot be confirmed. There 
is no negative influence but also no positive influence. [Bernheim 
and Levin (1989) show in a recent panel study the importance of ex- 
pectations. For a panel of US pre-retirement workers (58-63 years 
of age in 1969), followed for a period of ten years, social security 
had a significant negative effect on the private asset accumulation 
of single households, whereas the effect on the asset accun~ulation 
of couples was somewhat positive, but insignificant.] 
3.5 Starting-up problems 
The CR system needs a maturation period. At first the insured 
have to pay, but the benefits start to flow only after a maturation 
period. The PAYG system works immediately; this was one of 
the reasons why it was such a popular method for financing social 
security. This makes it difficult to replace a PAYG system by a 
CR system. In the time of maturation the enrolled would have 
to pay twice, once for the current benefit entitlements of the old 
and simultaneously for building up their own future entitlements. 
It follows that the substitution of CR by PAYG can only be done 
very gradually. 
3.6 The social security trap and moral hazard problem 
A well-recognized problem in social security, especially unemploy- 
ment insurance, is the so-called social security trap. [See van Praag 
and Emanuel (1983), van Praag and Konijn (1983) and van Praag 
and van Beek (1991).] If people become unemployed, the benefit 
burden increases and the number of contributors falls. It follows 
that social premiums have to be increased on a per capita basis and 
this will increase wage-costs for the employer, either directly or with 
some delay. However, since hiring and firing is done by employers 
for economic reasons and labor becomes more expensive, it will be 
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necessary to fire some additional workers, causing again higher so- 
cial premiums. The process is still more complex and amplified by 
the fact that many insurances cover incidents like sickness, disabil- 
ity (see Aarts and De Jong, 1992), and early retirement, which are 
not purely stochastic. In those cases, by means of collusion between 
employer and worker, people may declare themselves sick, disabled, 
etc. This problem is a moral hazard and its backfiring through the 
PAYG system may either trigger an explosive process or converge 
to reach a new equilibrium with higher unemployment. It is clear 
that under ideally strict circumstances this will not occur; moral 
hazard is also an issue under CR. However, under PAYG it is easy 
to adapt premiums year by year, i.e., to loosen financial discipline. 
Under CR, financial discipline will make it virtually impossible to 
admit moral hazard while the social security trap itself is absent. 
3.7 The risk of expropriation or default 
In a CR system there is one big "if". When you want to eat up your 
savings, are they then available to you? There is a slight chance of 
expropriation, but clearly this is negligible in most societies except 
in pre-revolutionary societies like Germany in 1919 and Russia in 
1917. However, the Maxwell scandal (1991) points to the fact that 
even nowadays a CR system runs the risk of non-performance. Even 
the Dutch government tries to extract wealth from the civil service 
pension fund, which may be seen as a partial expropriation of the 
policyholders by the state. Obviously, this expropriation risk is 
comparable in some sense with the demographic risk under PAYG 
where the young generation refuses to fulfill its obligations. In 
a good, stable legal structure where investments have been well 
spread the expropriation risk is remote or at least much less than 
the demographic risk under PAYG, which is completely based on 
"good fait.hn between generations. 
The pros a.nd cons are summarized in Table 5 where "+" stands 
for good, "-" for bad and "0" for so-so. 
Given this table we see that both insurance systems a.re some- 
what comp1ementar.y in their pros and cons. It follows tha.t we 
should look, ideally, for a mixture of both syst,ems. Given the big 
demographic risks, the ca.pita1 shortage reflected by the historically 
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Table 5. Qualitative comparison of CR and PAYG system. 
Capital reserve PAY G 
Demographic risk + - 
Inflationary risk 
Interest rate risk 
Savings potential 
Starting-up 
Social security trap 
Moral hazard 
Expropriation risk 0 t 
high level of world interest rates (see, e.g., Homer and Sylla, 1991), 
the existence of well-established property rights for investments and 
the prominent phenomena of the social security trap and moral haz- 
ard, we feel that,  at the moment, it would be wise to strive for a 
mixture which contains more CR elements than it does today. The 
solution of more funding in the face of fluctuations in public spend- 
ing is in line with the optimal fiscal policy rule of tax rate smoothing. 
Various authors have emphasized the need for such an optimal tax 
policy since it minimizes the distortionary effect of taxation. [See, 
e.g., Barro (1979), Keyfitz (1988), Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) 
and Marchand and Pestieau (1990). Van Praag and Poeth (1975) 
reach the same conclusion on the basis of a stylized m0de:l.l 
4 The Shift From PAYG Toward CR 
Lionel Robbins once stated that ". . .for good or for bad, on the 
whole economic history is a history of mixed systems - the practi- 
cal question concerns always the degree of the mixture" (Robbins, 
1971). The mixture of finance methods of PAYG and FF is a case 
in point. The central problem of steering toward CR is the nd- 
ditional premium to be paid. As we believe that hard times are 
ahead when we do not shift, we would prefer the softer medicine 
of gradual replacement of PAYG by CR above the hard solution 
where the PAYG system has to be trimmed considerably overnight 
before it can be replaced by the CR system. As will be clear from 
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the previous section we do not advocate a 100% shift from the 
PAYG system to the CR system. However, let us for the sake of 
argument consider such an experiment for pension insurance. Let 
us assume that population growth, technological progress, the in- 
flation rate and the real interest rate are zero. All these factors 
should be brought into play when the experiment has to be real- 
ized, but these factors complicate the reasoning and do not change 
the essence of the argument. 
In its essence, when risks are pooled, a pellsioll insurance re- 
serve may be compared to an empty bottle which is filled during the 
working period and emptied during retirement. Looking at the level 
of that bottle we see the reserve profile over life, as sketched in Fig- 
ure 1, where the assumption was made for the sake of convenience 
that all mortality is concentrated a t  the age of 75. Consequently, 
this age distribution is rectangular. Work starts a t  the age of 20. 
The  wage rate equals one and the benefit level is denoted by b% of 
the wage rate. 
It is obvious that for the situation of a non-zero interest rate 
the reserve profile becomes non-linear, but it remains essentially 
(topologically) the same. In the case of a constant consumption 
level over a lifetime, the premium at an annual rate of (1 - b) is 
paid throughout the working life of 45 years length and the reserve 
is depleted over 10 years of retirement with an annual benefit of 
b. In the practice of running a company's pension fund, contribu- 
tions and benefits will be frequently wage- or price-indexed which 
implies annual corrections for the contribution rate. In the present 
context we abstain from such complexities. It is obvious that on 
an aggregate basis, a lowering of the retirement age is just a shift 
of the top of the triangle to the left. 
In discussing the transition from a PAYG to an FF social se- 
curity system, there are two points which have to be questioned. 
First, is this transition only applicable for the case of public pen- 
sions or can we apply the shift from PAYG to FF also to  insurances 
like health, disability and unemployment? The reason for saying 
"yes" is that there is a specific pattern of risks over time, where the 
risk is a t  first minimal and grows over a lifetime. A similar picture 
to  that in Figure 1 may therefore be sketched for labor disability 
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Figure 1. Individual life-time asset accumulation. 
insurance since this risk is heavily age-related. The main difference 
in the retirement case of Figure 1 is that one has to save for aggre- 
gate risks over the working lifetime instead of the entire lifetime. 
For instance, for labor disability one would find the profile as drawn 
in Figure 2. 
In this case we assume that 1a.bor disability incidence starts to 
appear at about 40 and that the number of newly disabled increases 
with age. At first, the premiums exceed the benefits and we see the 
accumulated reserve grow. Therefore, the reserve profile does not 
go under the horizontal axis. This implies, in plain words, that the 
insurer does not have to honor obligations before the premium is 
earned. However, i t  is obvious that this holds only if the insurance 
is compulsory over an entire lifetime. In practice, compulsion is 
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Figure 2. Labor disability reserve profile per cohort. 
only a, point at the beginning, for later on the insured will have 
saved capital which makes it rather disadvantageous to leave the 
insurance program just when it starts to pay out. The reserve curve 
becomes flatter at age 40 and the actual depletion of the fund at an 
accelerating rate starts at 50. Table 6 gives some support to this 
disability profile. Similar reasoning describes the reserve patterns 
for sickness and health care insurance. (The majority of health cost 
insurance schemes are based on the method of PAYG, but there are 
examples, as in Germany, where health insurance is partly financed 
on a CR basis.) 
A second point is again that of moral hazard. As we pointed out 
before, the risk of unemployment or labor disability is not purely 
random, so it may (a.nd as Dutch experience has shown) be rather 
.advantageous both to the employer and the older employee to be 
declared disabled, etc., when times are hard on the firm. The risk 
incidence is endogenous, even if we introduce severe monitoring and 
control. The only way in which this self-selection can be countered 
is by setting up (dis)incentives both for workers and employees. For 
employees, early retirement has to be accompanied by a reduction 
in the benefits. Firm-specific premiums have to be experience-rated 
(see Burdett and Wright, 1989). However, we should keep in mind 
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Table 6. Age distribution of the disability beneficiaries and the 
insured population, and .age-specific DI-dependency rates for the 
Netherlands, 1986. 
Insured 
Disability population Disability insured 
Age brackets beneficiaries (percentages) dependency rate" 
15-24 1.5 24.2 0.1 
25-34 9.0 31.9 3.9 
35-44 18.5 24.0 9.9 
45-54 28.7 14.3 22.2 
55-64 42.3 5.6 52.0 
Tot a.1 100.0 100.0 12.5 
'Number of DI-beneficiaries as a percentage of the population at risk, including 
D [-beneficiaries. 
Source: Aarts and De Jong (1992, p. 38). 
that the moral hazard problem is just as harsh for PAYG insurance 
as under CR, while PAYG undoubtedly gives more possibilities for 
"budgetary flexibility" than the CR system. 
The basic difference between CR and PAYG is the insured pop- 
ulation. In PAYG the whole population is insured under the same 
terms, and the terms are fixed each year anew, mostly on the basis 
of demographic changes. Under CR each age cohort is insured sep- 
arately for essentially fixed terms, over a lifetime. This is evidently 
only possible if a cohort is big enough to get a good risk-pooling 
and if insurance per cohort is compulsory to avoid a self-selection 
phenomenon. Looking at Figure 1 and assuming our stylized con- 
dition of no population growth, no wage growth and a zero interest 
rate it is obvious that both PAYG and CR will lead to the same 
contribution rate for a given benefit rate. If capital is assumed to 
grow at an interest rate r > 0, it is obvious that the contribution 
per year may be less than in the case of a zero interest rate, since the 
accumulated capit a1 increases. If capital becomes more productive 
due to a technological progress rate g, this is another advantage. 
In a similar way, if there is positive constant population growth n, 
the ratio of old to young, i.e., the dependency rate, will be lower 
than under zero growth; consequently, contribution rates may be 
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Table 7a. Interest rates and growth rates for selected OECD 
countries, 1970-1979. 
USA Japan Germally France UK Italy Canada 
1.  Capital market 7.5 7.7 6.5 9.8 11.4 10.3 8.0 
interest rate 
2. Growth rate 8.2 14.3 9.8 13.5 16.4 18.9 9.1 
wages, private 
sector 
4. Real interest 0.4 1 . 4  1.6 0.9 1 . 2  2 . 0  0.6 
rate (1-3) 
5 .  Growth of 1.1 5.2 4.9 4.6 3.8 6.6 1.7 
real wage 
rate, private 
sector (2-3) 
6.  Labor force 2.5 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.7 3.2 
growth 
"Price level household consumption. 
Sources: OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Economic Outlook. 
lower for a given benefit rate than for a stagnant population. For 
stylized models the Aaron-condition (1966) tells us that if r > n, +y 
it is more advantageous to use the CR system than a PAYG sys- 
tem, while for r < i z  + g  the PAYG system would be advantageous. 
Evaluated according to that condition and assuming that the rate 
of technical progress is reflected in the real wage growth rate, Ta- 
bles 7a and 76 show the trend of this inequality over the last two 
decades in selected OECD economies. 
We see that in the 1970s there was (ex post) some reason ac- 
cording to  the Aaron-condition to utilize the PAYG system. In the 
1980s the inequality was inverted and a CR system should have been 
  refer red. However, apart from obviously needed model complica- 
tions the practical value of this Aaron-condition is rather limited, 
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Table 7b. Interest rates and growth rates for selected OECD 
countries, 1980-1989. 
- 
USA Japan Germany France UK Italy Canada 
1. Capital market 10.6 6.5 7.7 12.4 11.5 14.7 11.5 
interest rate 
2. Growth rate 5.8 4.6 4.5 8.5 9.7 13.2 7.3 
wages, private 
sector 
3. Inflationa 5.5 2.5 2.9 7.4 7.5 11.2 6.5 
4. Real interest 5.1 4.0 4.8 5.0 4.0 3.5 5.0 
rate (1-3) 
5. Growth of 0.3 2.1 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.0 0.8 
real wage 
rate private 
sector (2-3) 
6. Labor force 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.9 
growth 
7. Aaron-condition 3.1 0.7 2.4 3.5 1.1 0.6 2.3 
(4-5-6) 
"Price level household consumption. 
Sources: OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Economic Outlook. 
against the background of all relevant aspects given in Table 5 .  
[An obvious candidate for extending the model is the age-related 
income profile instead of the constant wage-rate growth. Empiri- 
cally one can find enough evidence that the age-income profile has 
an inverted U-shape (see Theeuwes et al., 1985, and Murphy and 
Welch, 1990).] 
Finally, we have to look at the question of how a transition has 
to take place. We assume a stylized demography where people work 
from age 20 to 65 and live for 10 years after retirement. Moreover, 
we assume a zero interest rate and population growth rate. 
It is true that the transition will cost additional money tem- 
porarily. For instance, let us assume, referring to the case of Fig- 
u re  1,  that the pension benefitlwage ratio or replacement rate is 
b = 0.6. The social security contribution ratio cr is found from the 
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balanced budget equation cr x (65 - 20) = 0.6 x (75 - 65). The RHS 
of this equation represents the expenditure side and the LHS the 
10 income of the social security system. It follows that cro = 0.6 x qg = 
13.3% is the initial PAYG premium. We set (1.1 = ao .  
Consider now a temporary surcharge (Dl) of 4%: that is, work- 
ers pay 17.3% of their wage income, viz., 13.3% to  pay the elderly 
and 4% to build up a capital reserve. Furthermore, a.ssume that 
the sum of the premiums of this mixture of PAYG and CR systeins 
will be held constant at  17.3%. It follows that the total premium 
is a1 + pl = 17.3%. In year 2 we have a yield of 45 ( a l  + PI) and 
we have to  pay 45 . 01. In year 3 the retiring cohort has a capital 
of pl and hence part of the retirement benefit, viz. P1/lO, and can 
be paid out of forced savings. From this it is clear that the PAYG 
benefit of being covered is only 10 . b - P1/lO. Consequently, the 
implicit PAYG premium a 2  is found from the equation 45 . a:, = 
10 . b - P1/lO, and consequently p2 = 17.3% - cr2. In year 4 there 
are two retired cohorts to  he supported. The first has saved P1/10 
the second (pl + P2)/10. We can see that PAYG premium cr3 is 
given by 4 5 .  a3 = 1 0 .  P - P1/lO- (PI + P2)/10. Again it is clear 
that P3 = 17.3% - as.  In short, the system is built up according to  
the following equations: 
where at + = 17.3%. Notice however that in this (simplified) 
system with zero interest and population growth, the stationary 
CR. premium is again given by the equation: 
We notice that  in the transition period at is steadily declining a t  
an  ever quickening rate and P is growing, their sum being constant. 
When at falls to  the surcharge level of 4%, the PAYG system has 
vanished, the CR has taken over and we stop the surcharge of 4%. 
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Table 8. Number of years to complete transition to fully funded 
social security. 
Benefit-wage ratio, 6 :  
0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 
Initial surcharge 
Po (%I 
4 44 42 4 1 3 9 
5 39 37 36 34 
6 3 5 33 31 2 9 
7 3 1 3 0 28 26 
After some calculations it can be seen that in 3 to 4 decades 
during which the premium is held at 17.3%, the original service 
may be totally financed from the capital reserve system, while the 
overall premium may be reduced to 13.3% if one wants to  stay 
at the original benefit level. Of course, if we start with a smaller 
surcharge the shift will take longer. If we do not plan a complete 
but rather a partial transition from PAYG to  CR, the shift takes, 
obviously, a shorter time period. Table 8 gives us an impression of 
the number of years to complete the transition from 100% PAYG 
to  the fully funded situation of 100% CR. 
Obviously this is a simplified calculation, but it catches the es- 
sentials. It is easy to complicate it with details, but the result is not 
very different under a wide range of parameter values. The general 
conclusion is that a transition is a painful but not impossible pro- 
cess. In this example we considered the retirement insurance. A 
(gradual) shift from PAYG to CR. for the other demographic insur- 
ances is feasible as well. Evidently, this analysis is only intended to 
show that a shift is not that formidable, lengthy and painful as is 
often thought and feared. For practical policy it is obvious that a 
detailed descriptive model is necessary, including a positive interest 
rate, non-stationary population growth, productivity growth, etc. 
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5 International Migration as a Solution 
It is frequently suggested that if a population is too old, one can fall 
back on a ready solution, viz., immigration of young people from 
the less developed countries. The reasoning behind this suggestion 
is that the North has the capital and the South has the people or 
labor. What could be more obvious than promoting immigration 
from the poor countries (notably countries in Africa) to the rich 
countries? We view this as an extremely naive and simplistic so- 
lution, which is actually dangerous for the North and not helping 
the South at all. It cannot be denied that the influx into a popula- 
tion of many young persons and families makes the host population 
younger. However, taking the Dutch population of 15 million as an 
example, we see that this solution would give rise to  ridiculous re- 
sults. The age bracket [14, 641 consists of 10.3 million people and 
the people of 65 years and older number 1.9 million individuals. 
The resulting ratio of retired persons to workers is 18.5%. Assum- 
ing an influx of only people of working age we see that it would 
require about 400,000 immigrants to change the dependency ratio 
one unit point. It is obvious that immigration into our already 
crowded country is not a viable way to change its demography sig- 
nificantly. In this example we assumed a short giant influx, which 
would clearly unbalance the age distribution over many years. 
Another possibility is a gradual inflow of about 50,000 persons 
per year. In this case the dependency ratio will not proportionately 
change in the short run. The main structural parameters behind 
the demographic situation are birth and mortality rates. So the 
question is really, what will be the impact of a gradual inflow on 
long-term birth and mortality rates? Again, we see that this impact 
will be small. Let the fraction of the old and new population be p 
and (1 - p) and let their birth rates equal Po and P, respectively, 
then the overall birth ratio will be just the weighted average pPo + 
(1 - p)P,. It follows that if p is relatively small, say below lo%, 
the birth ratio will not increase very much. In addition, the whole 
phenomenon is rather short-lived because the new immigrants will 
adapt themselves to the indigenous population and their fertility 
behavior will tend to the (lower) indigenous birth rate. The same 
reasoning holds for the mortality rate. In accordance with the views 
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of various authors like van Dalen (1992, ch. 5 ) ,  Felderer (1992), 
Ritzen and van Imlloff (1992), we concluclc that immigration of a 
realistic size can never solve the demographic aging problem of the 
Western welfare state. 
However, there is more to say about immigration. It is fre- 
quently thought that natives and immigrants are alike in terms 
of productive capacity and their contributions to national welfare. 
This is a popular and sympathetic misunderstanding, I~ased on the 
critical presumption that everyone is alike. In the present context 
we cannot deny that there are differences. We have to look at the 
relative differentials between the indigenous population and the im- 
migrants on various points: 
( a )  Social and cultural differences like race, religion, language and 
social norms. 
( b )  Human capital in terms of health. 
( c )  Education and experience with modern production organiza- 
tions. 
( d )  Experience with market economies. 
It is obvious that socio-cultural absorption by the host country 
becomes more difficult when there are more socio-cultural differ- 
ences. In this respect we do not necessarily refer to real differ- 
ences, but differences as they are perceived, sometimes b a e d  on 
mere prejudice. If absorption is difficult, the immigrants will form 
their subsocieties, as the Chinese, Italians, and Jews did in the first 
decade of this century when they immigrated into the USA and 
Canada. However, such subsocieties have to maintain themselves 
more or less, which requires a critical mass in numbers, physical 
concentration and social education. It is in these terms that the 
immigration waves from Europe during the period 1850-1950 into 
the New World have to be understood. 
Measuring the new potential immigration flows to the Western 
welfare states we see that there are great differences between the 
waves into North America during the period 1850-1950 and the 
new waves into North America from Latin America and into West- 
ern Europe from the Far East and Africa. Firstly, the socio-cultural 
differences between host and immigrants are on average larger. Sec- 
ondly, the modern welfare states have grown enormously in richness, 
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wealth and complexity of technology and socio-economic fabric dur- 
ing the last 50 years, while Eastern Europe and most African coun- 
tries have stagnated. In short, the gap between, e.g., the USA and 
Russia 70 years ago was much less pronounced than nowadays and 
this holds a fortiori for present-day Europe compared with coun- 
tries like Turkey, North Africa or Eastern Europe. It  follows that 
the absorption of immigration nowadays is really more difficult than 
50 years ago. 
The  points ( a )  to ( d )  listed above are, of course, related to 
the first point on socio-economic differences. However, they relate 
illore directly to the burden which immigrants may lay on the so- 
cial security system of the host country. First, we have to recognize 
that the health capital of the individual is created during child- 
hood. Therefore, immigrants are almost always at a disadvantage 
compared with the children in the host country. The risk of falling 
ill is greater and life expectancy is shorter than in the host coun- 
try. Therefore it is not strange, for instance, that about half of the 
beneficiaries of Dutch disability benefits have been horn elsewhere. 
The  same holds true for education, technical skills and market ori- 
entation. Therefore, the admission of large-scale unscreened immi- 
gration will almost certainly create a socio-economic 1~nde1-class in 
the host countries. Given the solidarity in the modern welfare state, 
the rights to family reunification, and the equality of rights granted 
on ethical grounds to  immigrants (even before naturalization, as 
in the Netherlands) immigration will almost certainly generate a 
heavy strain on the social security system. Instead of alleviating 
the pressure on the social security system the most likely outcome 
of mass immigration will be an aggravation of the problems of the 
modern welfare state, as Dutch society tragically demonstrates at  
the moment. 
A final point which should be kept in mind is that of the optz- 
mal population size. There are countries which are underpopulated 
and countries which are overpopulated. Immigration into overpop- 
ulated countries like Japan or the Netherlands should be discour- 
aged. However, the abstract optimal population concept is rather 
difficult to  substantiate. It varies according to time, technology and 
with the prevailing age distribution. Apart from that,  we have to 
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ask where immigrants go to within the countries of their choice. For 
instance, France as a whole is probably underpopulated. However, 
rnost immigrants tend to go to the big urban regions like Paris, 
Lyon and Marseille. In those places there is overpopulation. 
At the level of economic analysis the capital-labor ratio in the 
developed countries is much larger than in the LDCs. One way 
to get equalization is to bring people to capital. As argued be- 
fore, this is not advisable in practice. Another option is to bring 
capital to people; in other words, export capital generated by the 
developed countries to the LDCs. This looks more hopeful for both 
partners. First, there is an enormous scarcity of capital in LDCs. 
Second, as argued before, it is very desirable for our aging societies 
to  base our social security to  a greater extent on a capital reserve 
system. This will generate additional savings which can be used for 
investment possibilities. On condition that the LDCs offer a good 
investment climate with well-defined property rights, the possibility 
of appointing foreign staff in high positions for a temporary period 
and the possibility of transferring a t  least part of the profits to the 
country that invests, this type of investment may simultaneously 
aid the LDCs and support the ailing social security systems of the 
developed countries. 
Is this arrangement tantamount to neo-colonialisnz? It cannot 
be denied that there is some similarity. However, in this case the 
relation may be based on a more even-handed relationship as the 
interests of both partners are evidently a t  stake and both partners 
are also able, by a vote, to end the relationship and to inflict severe 
damage on the other party. This solution, which has among others 
been suggested by van Dalen (1992), seems to be the only viable 
solution to the aging problem and the development problem. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to develop some theses about the 
problems connected to the changing population structure in West- 
ern societies. Obviously, we aimed at a non-technical exposition. 
This is not really weakening our standpoint very much, since the 
real model is not exactly known. It might be, although it is not very 
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probable, that birthrates will rise again in the coming decade. A 
model is always an imperfect description of reality and in this con- 
text the exactitude of any model is only apparent, since there are so 
many differences between countries. However, we assume that we 
have made it sufficiently clear to the readers that the phenomenon 
of the aging society is a situation which poses a serious threat to 
modern welfare states as they developed after the Second World 
Wa,r. The Achilles heel results from the pay-as-you-go method of 
finance, by means of which the great majority of social security 
systems are financed nowadays. In this respect, it does not make a. 
major difference whether the system is financed by a separate pay- 
as-you-go fund or that the contributions are made as part of regular 
taxes and the benefits distributed from the general tax revenue of 
the state. In both cases the dependency ratio, which may increase 
to dangerous levels, is the factor which will certainly cause a lot of 
social tension. We have noticed, in this respect, that the whole so- 
cial security structure suffers f ro~n the same problem. It is not only 
a problem of old age retirement benefits, but it is also pertinent to 
the benefits for labor disability, sickness and unemployment. 
Given this point, it is absolutely necessary to look in time for 
a solution which can at least alleviate the problem. We plead for 
a reconsideration of the capital reserve system as a partial substi- 
tute for the present system of finance. We outlined the various 
advantages and disadvantages of the two main financing structures 
and made it clear that a transition toward the CR system from the 
PAYG system is painful, but certainly feasible in a limited number 
of years. Given a global capital shortage for the decades to come 
and the fact that the worst time is still to come, since the depen- 
dency ratio will really reach dramatic levels in the '20s and the '30s 
of the next century, there is still the possibility of increasing the 
capital reserve part of the social security system. The shift will be 
more painful in the next century and the resulting investments are, 
at the moment and for the decades to come, badly needed. We 
hope very much that this position paper will lead to discussions in 
the circles around IIASA. IIASA has built up in the last 20 years 
an impressive structure for scientific research. It is also one of the 
few places from which a really international network of scientists 
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and policy-makers emanates. The problem we dealt with today is 
a problem with interesting scientific aspects. However, it is, fore- 
most, a political problem which should be solved by policy-makers 
in the various countries. 
The second point which we have tried to make is that the de- 
mographic imbalances in the Western world, although superficially 
just the opposite of the current imbalances in the less developed 
world, cannot and should not be solved by mass immigration from 
the LDCs to the developed countries. This will make no sense and, 
in reality, will make the problems worse for developed countries. 
However, for the LDCs also, a mass emigration is not advisable. It 
is obvious that the people who will emigrate from the LDCs will 
be mostly the young and highly-skilled persons. Their emigration 
would constitute a loss for their own countries. On the other hand, 
the controlled export of capital and investment of Western capital 
in less developed countries and Eastern Europe would have a favor- 
able effect both on the exporting and the importing countries. In 
this respect the World Rank can play a still greater role. 
Let us finish now by wishing IIASA all the best in its mission 
for our global society and with the hope that in the future much 
more attention will be given to the problems we have tried to expose 
today. 
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Rapporteur's Report 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Population aging - to  be distinguished from individual aging - is the 
demographic process in which tlie age distribution of tlie population 
moves toward the older age groups. This can be measured either 
through the increase in the mean age of t,he population or through 
the increasing proportions of tlie population above a certain high 
age, e.g., age 60, 65, 70, etc. Because of irregularities in the age 
distributions these different indicators of aging need not ilecessarily 
result in identical pictures of the aging process. The  i~llrllediate 
demographic causes of population aging are usually corllbinatioiis 
of declining fertility and increasing life expectancy. However, either 
one of these trends would be sufficient to  result in some, although 
slower, aging. The migration comporlent of population change may 
also result in the aging of regional populations if there is a high 
proportion of young people emigrating from a certain area, as is 
seen in many rural areas, or if an unproportionally high group of 
elderly immigrate into a specific region, as is the case in parts of 
Florida. 
1 Aging in Industrialized and 
Developing Countries 
At present, human populations are aging in all parts of the world, 
and it is very likely that they will be aging even more rapidly in the 
future. According to  the medium variant of the UN population pro- 
jections, the mean age of the population is likely to  increase by 1.5 
Population Project, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria. 
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Table 1. Mean ages of the population in 6 world regions by the 
year 2100 according to an extension of the UN medium variant, in 
years. 
1990 22.2 25.8 29.8 24.8 24.8 35.8 28.0 
2000 22.7 27.4 31.8 26.0 26.1 37.3 29.1 
2010 23.8 29.4 34.9 27.8 28.2 39.0 30.8 
2020 25.6 31.5 37.5 30.0 30.4 40.5 32.5 
2030 28.1 33.5 39.9 32.9 32.9 41.8 34.6 
2040 30.1 35.2 41.9 35.4 35.0 42.6 36.3 
2050 31.6 36.3 43.1 37.4 36.4 42.8 37.5 
2060 33.0 37.1 43.7 39.0 37.5 42.9 38.3 
2070 33.8 37.5 44.1 40.2 38.1 43.0 38.9 
2080 34.2 37.7 44.2 40.8 38.4 43.0 39.0 
2090 34.3 37.8 44.3 41.1 38.5 43.0 39.0 
2100 34.4 37.8 44.3 41.1 38.5 43.1 38.9 
Source: Lutz and Prinz (1991). 
years between 1990 and 2000 in the industrialized countries taken 
together (from 35.8 years to 37.3 years). However, the populations 
of Eastern Asia and Latin America are on track for even more rapid 
aging, a fact that is often disregarded. As the UN medium vari- 
ant given in Table 1 suggests, the mean age of the population is 
likely to increase by 2.0 years in Eastern Asia (which is essentially 
China) and by 1.6 years in Latin America. Even in Africa, which 
has still very high fertility rates, the UN medium variant suggests 
an increase in the mean age by 0.5 years by the year 2000. 
Alternative scenarios calculated by Lutz and Prinz (1991) show 
that even in the case of a much slower future fertility decline than 
assumed by the UN medium variant (if the medium variant level is 
reached only within 60 years instead of 35), moderate population 
aging will take place in all regions of the world. This scenario, 
however, would result in a total world population size of more than 
14 billion. A rapid fertility decline scenario, on the other hand (that 
would bring Western European fertility levels to all regions of the 
world by 2025), would effectively curb world population growth to 
peak at  around only eight billion by the middle of the next century 
and decline somewhat thereafter. In this case, however, population 
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aging would be immense. The mean age of the world population 
would increase from around 28 years at present, to 34 years by 2020, 
43 years by 2050 and even close to 50 years by the end of the next 
century. In certain regions, such as Africa, today's very young age 
structure would experience an even more extreme aging process 
resulting in a doubling of the mean age between 1990 and 2060. 
By 2020 Eastern Asia would approach present mean ages in the 
industrialized countries, followed by the rest of the world, except 
for Africa, by 2030. [A detailed account of alternative assumptions 
and projections for 12 world regions is given in Lutz (1994).] 
In short, these calculations can be summarized by the statement 
that mankind has a choice between excessive further population 
growth or extreme aging. A compromise between these extremes, 
as described, e.g., by the U N  medium variant, will result in both 
significant further population growth and significant aging. Even 
in this intermediate case, aging in most developing countries will 
be more rapid than in Europe and North America. However, there 
is a big difference between the two hemispheres in their experi- 
ence and ability to cope with the social and economic problems of 
population aging. The industrialized countries and especially Eu- 
rope have three decades of experience in population aging and have 
an even longer tradition of very elaborate social security systems 
to  support the increasing proportion of elderly. Of course, as the 
population continues to  age these systems will come under great 
pressure and, as will be discussed below, some modifications are 
inevitable. On the other hand, it should be pointed out here that 
these problems in the industrialized countries seem to be of a dif- 
ferent order of magnitude compared with the developing countries, 
which generally do not have any old age security systems, neither 
private nor public, no social infrastructure of support for the el- 
derly aside from the family, and no savings or reserves that could 
be in any way compared with that of the industrialized countries. 
If family size declines rapidly and some persons have no children 
a t  all - which is highly desirable from a population growth point 
of view - then the rapidly increasing number of elderly people in 
those countries will have little if nothing to rely on in the future. 
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Despite these gloomy prospects in the developing countries, the 
discussion in the conference session on population-aging focused 
largely on industrialized countries and their problems in restructur- 
ing old age social security systems. Nevertheless, such a discussion 
is justified and will be reported here for two reasons: first, it is 
a real question that is heavily discussed in political and scientific 
circles in most industrialized countries and, second, it is hoped that 
the solutions found in the North will also prove useful for the devel- 
oping countries in designing and building up their old age security 
systems in the future. 
2 Specific Aspects of Aging in 
Industrialized Countries 
The following comments refer to relevant points made during the 
discussion and hence do not always logically follow each other. 
When talking about the changing shape of the age pyramid in 
the process of aging it is useful to distinguish between aging at the 
top of the pyramid (i.e., a relative expansion at the older ages) 
which is induced by declining mortality, and aging at the bottom 
(i.e., a relative shrinking at the young ages) which results from de- 
clining fertility. Although the origin and determinants for these two 
processes are very different they have similar effects on the mean 
age of the population or on the proportions of the population be- 
yond certain ages. For a more detailed analysis of aging by specific 
age groups such as the very old or school-age population, the dis- 
tinction between mortality induced and fertility induced aging is 
very relevant. 
A frequently used demographic indicator of the economic and 
social security burden, which the active population has to carry for 
the economically not active population, is the dependency ratio. 
The old age dependency ratio is defined as the population above a 
certain critical age (mostly 65) divided by the population in active 
age (mostly defined as 15-64). This ratio is based only on the sizes 
of age groups and does not reflect actual economic activity and 
unemployment, actual ages of beginning work and of retirement, 
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nor actual productivity of certain age groups. Hence, it is only a 
very rough indicator of the actual economic burden of aging. 
The  young age dependency ratio is defined similarly as the num- 
ber of persons aged 0-14 divided by the population aged 15-64. The 
total dependency ratio, therefore, is the surn of the young age and 
old age dependency ratios. Empirically, most industrialized coun- 
tries have seen over the past years an increase in old age depel~dency 
and a decrease in young age dependency (because of declining fer- 
tili ty). Total dependency ratios generally did not change rnuch. 
Now, depending or1 what ratio is chosen, researchers tend to  give 
very different messages. Tlle ones focusing on old age dependency 
only point to  rapidly increasing stress on the whole system and the 
likelihood of considerable decreases in welfare. The ones looking 
at total dependency point at  relatively stable conditions with the 
burden only moving from caring for children to caring for the aged. 
One comment from the audience: "Looking after children is fun, 
caring for the aged less so". One further difference is that caring 
for children is largely considered to be the individual responsibility 
of the parents, while caring for the elderly in modern societies is 
mostly a public resporlsibility. 
Is aging in the history of populations only a transitory pro- 
cess, one specific aspect of the demographic transition? If this is 
the case then the present concerns might be orlly of limited rele- 
vance. A look a t  the laws of population dynamics shows that if 
a t  some point life expectancy no longer increases and fertility re- 
mains constant then, indeed, population aging is only an episocle in 
population history, and ultimately there will be a stable populatioll 
age structure. If, however, fertility remains constant below replace- 
ment level and there are no significant migration gains, then the 
stable population pyramid will be broader at  the top than a t  the 
bottom. At some point the mean age of the population would not 
increase any more and, technically, there would be no more aging, 
hut the population would shrink at a constant rate. If only fertility 
remained constant and life expectancy continued to increase, then 
aging would continue. The same is true if fertility declined further. 
Do the consequences of aging affect different cohorts in differ- 
ent ways? It has been often stressed that the members of the baby 
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boom (i.e., the large birth cohorts of the 1960s) are in the worst 
position throughout their lives. They not only have higher compe- 
tition from kindergarten to the job market and places in old age 
nursing homes, but also they will not have an equal number of peo- 
ple in subsequent generations to pay for their retirement benefits 
once the baby boomer generation reaches pension age. However, 
actually those smaller cohorts who come after the baby boom seem 
to  be even worse off in many aspects. Admittedly, in kindergarten 
and school there is less competition because this is strictly age- 
dependent, but in the job market the baby boomers will have occu- 
pied all the good jobs and will keep them for quite a while. Later 
on, the old age dependency burden will be much greater on the 
post-baby boomers than on the baby boomers. 
One important aspect of population aging concerns the in- 
creased health care requirements for the elderly. There is little 
doubt that there will be a significantly greater demand for health 
care of the elderly in the future. The extent to which this de- 
mand will increase, however, largely depends on future trends 
in disability-free life expectancy in relationship to total life ex- 
pectancy. While in the past many studies pointed to a trend of 
increasing periods in the individual life span that require intensive 
health care, there are some indications of a reversal of this trend. 
If disability-free life expectancy actually increased as fast as total 
life expectancy or even faster, this would significantly help to ease 
the stress on health care facilities in the future. 
3 Population Aging and Changes 
in Productivity 
There seems to be no systematic scientific review of the effects 
of population aging on economic productivity. There is very little 
empirical proof for the often stressed statement that an older society 
is less productive. The argument behind this statement usually 
refers to  individual productivity curves and often takes income as 
a proxy for productivity. However, even the relationship between 
age and income varies among industrialized countries. While in 
North America there seems to be some decline in income even before 
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retirement, this is not observable in many European countries where 
automatic age-based salary increases are built into the systems. 
The  other argument, that young people are generally more dynamic 
and more easily adapt to new technologies may well be true, but 
it has not yet been shown how this affects overall productivity and 
how it ranks relative to the experience and wisdom of the elderly. It 
is clear that more research is needed in this field before conclusive 
statements can be made. 
Another ironic point is that ,  while many people complain about 
the negative effects of aging on productivity, they also point to the 
low productivity of developing countries as being caused by rapid 
population growth, i.e., too young an age structure. Clearly the 
age distribution of the population is not one of the most signifi- 
cant factors affecting productivity. Even on the human capital side 
(leaving out technology) it seems to  be more the education and 
skills of people that matter than simply their age. 
4 Can Immigration Compensate for the 
Negative Effects of Aging? 
In the present debate on the desirable levels of immigration into Eu- 
rope, one can often hear the demographic argument that immigra- 
tion is absolutely necessary to compensate for the birth gap in most 
countries. Here again, purely demographic arguments that do not 
consider skills, the participation of females ir, the labor force and 
productivity may be misleading. However, even the demographic 
effects of immigration on population-aging are not that simple and 
clear. 
If immigrants arrive at  young ages, as they usually do, then 
in the short run it is clear that immigration will counteract aging, 
especially if the immigrants also have children. Hence, in the short 
run, they will improve the old age dependency ratio and decrease 
the mean age of the population. In the long run, however, if im- 
migrants do not return to their home countries they will also age 
and contribute to an increase in the old age dependency burden. 
Hence, new immigrants or descendants of the former immigrants 
will have to  enter the labor force in order to  neutralize the effects 
46 Wolfgang L u t z  
of retirement of the former immigrants. Since in Western Europe 
there are presently about 5 men aged 15-64 to 1 man above age 
65, 1 immigrant retiring should be replaced by 5 other people in 
the labor force in order not to negatively influence the old age de- 
pendency ratio in that year. Hence, a gain in the near future has 
to be discounted by a burden in the more distant future. A posi- 
tive balance is only assured if net migration gains are constant over 
time, if not increasing. Since European age structures tend to be 
very irregular, an interesting demographically oriented immigration 
policy could also be to have immigrants fill in the gaps in the age 
structure but not add to already exceptionally large cohorts. This 
may have a generally stabilizing effect. 
From the social security perspective it seems to be clear that 
presently immigrants tend to contribute more to the system than 
they consume. This will also be true in the near future when very 
few immigrants will be entitled to draw pensions. As compared 
with the native population, immigrants who enter the country in 
their 20s will not be in the position to consume young age benefits 
such as education and some health expenditures. In the case of 
unemployment, immigrants who still have foreign citizenship tend 
to have less social benefits than natives. Also, finally, a certain 
proportion of immigrants return to their home countries before they 
are entitled to any pension benefits, although they contributed to 
the systems. 
However, all over Europe one can find strong non-material ar- 
guments to oppose immigration. In a positive way these arguments 
may be summarized as an attempt to preserve specific heritage. 
Weighing these arguments against the benefits of migrants goes 
beyond scientific analysis and will be subject to a broad political 
process of societal consensus-finding. In any case, it is clear that the 
alternatives cannot be entirely opeE or completely closed borders 
but an increase or decrease in immigration and efforts to integrate 
the newcomers. 
On a more global perspective it is clear that immigration into 
industrialized countries can in no way be a solution to the rapid 
population growth in developing countries (a  figure mentioned in 
the discussion). At present, only up to two million migrants a 
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year could realistically be absorbed by the industrialized countries. 
This is only a minimal fraction of the vast potential of people in 
less developed countries who might desire to move to the more 
developed countries. 
Although the real number of emigrants from many developing 
countries tends to be insignificant for these quickly growing popu- 
lations, the kinds of people leaving may cause serious concerns in 
those countries. Generally only the more educated, more well-to-do 
and more dynamic people can find their way to Europe or North 
America and get a job there. This may result in a painful brain 
drain in the country of origin. 
In conclusion, it can be said that large-scale migration flows 
bea,r many risks of instability and are certainly not a perfect and 
easy remedy against aging in industrialized countries. Limited mi- 
gration on a manageable scale, however, is likely to add to the 
flexibility of labor markets and be beneficial for the North and in 
some cases also for the South if there is a back flow of trained people 
or resources. 
In general, the degree to which population-aging will present 
a major problem in the industrialized as well as in the develop- 
ing countries will depend on the future course of development and 
future increases in productivity. Accounting for population-aging, 
which is an  unavoidable consequence of declining fertility, should, 
however, become an integral part of the planning for sustainable 
development. 
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